lesion and until they began to fight among themselves the Transvaalers had little further trouble with the tribesmen[63]. Was this, in fact, the case?

Five separate expeditions were launched against Mankopane: the first in December 1855, the second in July 1856, the third in April 1858, the fourth in March 1859 and the fifth in July 1868. He defied and survived each until the Trekkers, wearied with the effort of fighting him, accepted in the independence he had always claimed. They concluded peace and displayed, in their private correspondence, a more than healthy regard in wanting to maintain that peace[64].

Mankopane cast as the chief villain of the piece — the man putatively responsible for ‘skinning Hermanus Potgieter alive’[65] — emerges from the story of the cave siege as a fierce but exemplary African patriot[66]. He lived to the ripe old age of seventy-two and never, between the twenty-three years spanning the attacks and his death, was he ever subjugated.

Was the Siege of Makapansgat a massacre? Perhaps. Was it a Trekker victory? Hardly.

As he himself said, he drafted Snell on Equipto the Bohugamoti.

P.A. Huttenback[1]

Gandhi came to South Africa in 1893 and left in 1914. He led, during most of the twenty-one year span, struggles against the Natal Government, the Transvaal Government and the Union Government. What was the guiding principle, the driving force behind this fight? Was it a civil rights struggle, a case of championing the cause of the Indians, Coloureds and Africans against the racist politics of an all-white administration? Was it a class struggle in the interests of the Indian trading class or, alternatively, of the Indian labouring class? Or was it a nationalist struggle in the cause of India and the Indian nation?

During his South African sojourn, Gandhi never questioned the right of the whites to rule and regulate the destiny of South Africa. In July 1909 he acknowledged that the Indians recognized that the white population 'should remain predominant in South Africa'[2]. He also, perhaps in a naive way, endorsed non-miscegenation when he noted, in a political retort, that he too was committed to race purity, but protested that purity of race should not be the privilege of only one sector of the community[3].

He accepted white superiority but rejected black equality. In February 1904 he complained to the Johannesburg medical health officer: 'Why, of all places in Johannesburg, the Indian Location should be chosen for dumping down all the Kaffirs of the town passes my comprehension.' He urged that the Town Council 'withdraw the Kaffirs' and lamented that the 'mixing' was unfair and an undue tax on the Indians' patience[4]. He complained when he and fellow passive resisters were classed, while in prison, with the Africans[5]. He was critical
of the whites' ignorant and — careless use of the term 'Coolie', yet his own use of the term Kaifir was no less ignorant and no less careless.

When in March 1906 the Coloured community circulated a petition, addressed to the King, in which they complained of not having the fruits of the Transvaal and in the Orange River Colony, he wrote, justifying the Indians non-identity with the petition: 'We consider that it was a wise policy on the part of the British Indians throughout South Africa, to have kept themselves apart and distinct from the other Coloured communities in this country'. He admitted that the Co-loureds and the Indians had common grievances but their respective claims, he insisted, had very little in common[6]. He also protested when the Natal Government wanted to open Durban's Higher Grade Indian School to Coloured children[7].

In 1906 some Zulu under a minor chief, Rambatta, smarting under an increased poll tax, protested. The white Natalists designated and then treated their discontent as a 'rebellion'. The Colonial forces were mobilized and sent out to chastise the malcontented Zulu. Gandhi, considering he was a British subject and a Natal citizen, was moved to demonstrate his loyalty in a practical way: he offered to organise a stretcher-bearer corps, as he had done during the Anglo-Boer War. But during the voluntary service the cold-steel spite of the colonial forces, their relentless tracking down of their foe and their trigger-happy readiness to kill turned his stomach. Loyalty to the Empire, however, made him hold his tongue. He admitted later that he bore the Zulu no grudge; that they had not, after all, harmed the Indians. He also admitted that he had doubts about the 'rebellen'. He always held his conviction that the British Empire was there to serve mankind and that loyalty prevented him from wishing it ill. His decision was therefore not influenced by the legitimacy or otherwise of the 'rebellion'[8]. This statement, however, was made in 1927 — two decades and more after the event. In 1906 his choice was less ambiguous:

It is not for us to say whether the revolt of the Kaifirs is justified or not. What is essential for the British Government to decide is whether it is justified in the interest of the Empire, and which is the Empire? It is obvious that our loyalty was not a question of personal interest, but of the best interest of the Indian nation and the Empire. We are in Natal by virtue of British power. Our very existence depends upon it. It is therefore our duty to render whatever help we can[9].

The division between Indian and African was, in his eyes, not antagonistic yet both precise and proper. In a 1905 letter he referred to the 'colored and sharp distinctions that undoubtedly exist between British Indians and the Kaifir races[10]. In 1909 he expressed his opinion on the question clearly and succinctly: 'We may entertain no aversion to Kaifirs, but we cannot ignore the fact that there is a common ground between them and us in the daily affairs of life[11].

Gandhi, of course, was not a racist. Writing of his prison experience, he reflected that not being classified with the whites was to a certain extent acceptable, but being classed with the Africans was not. On the other hand, being with the Africans provided an opportunity of witnessing their treatment, of experiencing their conditions and of observing their habits. In this light, he concluded: 'it did not seem right to feel bad about being bracketed with them[12].

The Indians Gandhi found in Natal were a divided, heterogeneous community. An attempt has been made recently to describe them sociologically as a mish-mash of 'merchants, migrants, commercial elite, new elite and underclasses'[14]. The description, although helpful, is insufficient — who, for instance, made up the 'non-commercial elite', the 'old elite' and the 'overclasses'? What is essential for the purpose at hand is to note that:

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Most of the Indians came to Natal as indentured labourers, as new or temporary slaves[15]. Where a minority came as free-paying passengers. This difference of origins, though affected by time and change, remained crucial.

Most of the passenger Indians were traders. They came with expec-
class. He naturally identified with those who were clean, educated and golden opportunity' for the 'a
His bias by upbringing, tradition and culture was with the trader
be up to the whites
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rebut white sneers and accusations that the Indians were mere
second, perhaps subordinate, but certainly revealing reason
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was not, he believed, 'free men'. ~nd
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To demonstrate loyalty to the British Empire
When the Anglo-Boer War broke out in October 1899, Gandhi
This campaign knows no distinctions of Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Christians, Bengalis, Madrasis, Gujaratis, Punjabis and others. All of them were Indians. Those who do not realize this are not servants but enemies of the motherland[17].
Yet he drew a line between the indentured labourers and the other Indians. The indentured Indians were not, he believed, 'free men'. And even when they were free they came under the provision of special laws[18]. He therefore accepted that there was a certain logic in checking their movements, and that a curfew law could, in their case, be justified.
His bias by upbringing, tradition and culture was with the trader class. He naturally identified with those who were clean, educated and civilized; and just as naturally endorsed Cecil John Rlodes' anti-democratic formula of equal rights for all civilized men. In 1895 he wrote: 'I am confident that the Indians [and he was, of course, referring to the passenger Indians] have no wish to see ignorant Indians who cannot possibly be expected to understand the value of a vote being placed on the Voters' List'[19].
In 1908 he wrote that the Asiatic question was primarily a trade question[20]. Earlier, when a handful of colonial-born Indians (the so-called 'New Elite') dared to question the unrepresentative nature of the Natal Indian Congress, he would scold them, charge them with being ungrateful and admonish them for ignoring everything that Congress had done for them. Emphasis in Congress, he conceded, were on trader interests (the dissidents thought traders and trader interests too excessively monopolized the proceedings of Congress) but this he considered inevitable and just:
If the Indian traders today boom large at the Congress meetings, it is because they are the most in danger; and if they were neglected or allowed themselves to be neglected, who will suffer? Certainly the whole Indian community; for throughout the world it is the commercial class that supplies the sinews of war and even common sense to the community or nation to which it belongs[21].
Two years later, in 1909, during the Passive Resistance Campaign, he emphasized once again that it was the businessmen who shouldered the burden of the struggle. It was their stake which was most at risk because they enjoyed 'a higher status'; it was they who most acutely emphasized once again that it was the businessmen who shouldered the burden of the struggle. It was their stake which was most at risk because they enjoyed 'a higher status'; it was they who most acutely

With the British Empire was clearly one of the reasons why Gandhi wanted the Indians to participate in the War. A second, perhaps subordinate, but certainly revealing reason - was to refute white sneers and accusations that the Indians, being mere moneypathers and rank opportunists, that they would not in the event of an invasion render the slightest aid and that it would be up to the whites to defend them. He therefore felt it was a golden opportunity for the
Indiana's proud to be railroad-tied traders. While the Natal traders did not hold the same opinion of the indentured labourers, the planter class, at least, recognized their importance and acknowledged the beneficial effect their coming had had on Natal's economy. Gandhi himself was aware of this, for he had declared that Natal owed its present prosperity to the indentured Indians[25]. The stigma of opprobrium was never levelled at the indentured or ex-indentured labourers; on the contrary, their presence was regarded as a military asset against the threat of a possible Zulu attack[26].

The Ambulance Corps was formed with about three to four hundred ex-indentured and about seven hundred indentured Indians. From the former group came the thirty-seven that served as Gandhi's lieutenants. According to Gandhi, they were made up of barristers, accountants, masons, carpenters and ordinary labourers. All sections of the Indian community were represented — except the passenger-traders[27].

At Spionkop, at Vaalkranz and at Colenso the Indian Ambulance Corps, riding life and limb, worked under heavy fire. A British general leading a group of officers, for instance, told them to get on with their work in silence. An American officer added, 'We'll save you the trouble. You can go on with your work, but don't let them know you are doing it'[28]. The moving spirit of the meeting was not Gandhi but Hal Perl Habib (or Sleeth Hal) Habib, whom Gandhi described as 'a very old experienced resident of South Africa'[29]. Habib, more significantly, was also the brother of Dada Abdulla. Dada Abdulla's extensive Natal-based business was one of the biggest Indian commercial enterprises in South Africa[30]. Hal Perl Gandhi, with some hesitation, followed. This is evident from the English translation of Habib's contribution:

Gandhi evidently had in mind the passenger-traders, the white Natal traders. The British Government is in power the time has come for us to go to goal. (Applause) I recommend the same plan to you all. Are you all prepared to take the oath? (The assembly seated up to a man and said, 'Yes, we will go to goal!) Only by doing shall we succeed. We tried this method in the days of the Zulu invasion. Yet none of the passenger-traders assisted under battle conditions — none of them actually participated in the Ambulance Corps, risking life and limb, worked under heavy fire. A British general leading a group of officers, for instance, told them to get on with their work in silence. An American officer added, 'We'll save you the trouble. You can go on with your work, but don't let them know you are doing it'[28].

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Gandhi ever thought of the idea. So at this stage Gandhi did not lead the Transvaal traders; the Transvaal traders led him.

The Passive Resistance Campaign 'fed on jail sentences' [37]. By January 1908 one hundred and fifty-five were incarcerated and by March 1909, one hundred and eleven [38]. But jail sentences, though on occasion harsh, could not compare with deprivations and withholding of trading licenses. Once the Transvaal Government started applying these, the movement lost its momentum, slid into a stalemate and reached the doldrums by early 1909 [39]. But whether the movement was at a crest or in a trough, the volunteers were nearly always from the unindented community a community that in the Transvaal was in a minority [40].

A few traders, notably Ahmed Mohammed Cachalia, a Surti Memons, 'one of the rarest among the Musalmans' (as Gandhi described him), understood and put the sacrifices that had been demanded [41]. But the vast majority of Transvaal traders supported the movement on the understanding that it would protect them against legislation seeking to destroy their businesses. By October 1907 it dawned on them that they stood a better chance of preserving their businesses with Smuts's Acts than with Gandhi's protests [42]. Helen Habib, the moving spirit, the firebrand of the all-important meeting at the Empire Theatre, temporarily and conveniently left the Transvaal in December 1907 [43].

As early as November 1907, Gandhi was commencing the Memons - the spearhead of the Indian trading class - in the country districts of the Transvaal for having given up the fight [44]. By March 1909 he admitted that with the exception of the Tamils and a handful of Parsis, all the other sections of the community had abandoned the struggle [45]. It is apparent that the two delegates entertained, as Gandhi himself put it, 'divergent views' [50]. The meaning of this divergence is clear: the traders had abandoned faith in passive resistance. They left Gandhi to struggle on with his band of faithful followers - left, as they saw it, to bang his head against a wall [51].

It is true that the traders had accepted Gandhi's leadership - and even his misconceptions - as long as it did not touch their pockets; but when he began to equate poverty with saintliness, they demurred. They told him repeatedly that truth and business were incompatible. Religion, they had stressed, was a spiritual matter; separate and distinct from the practical affairs of business. How were they to react, how could they react when Gandhi (who obviously had them in mind), so prophet and advised (to their minds) like a madman:

'There is no question of entering into any negotiations with the Transvaal Administration, because it has already been determined that with the exception of the Tamils and a handful of Parsis, all the other sections of the community had abandoned the struggle.'

Gandhi endorsed Habib's representative claim and admitted that he himself worked on behalf of the smaller and poorer section of the community, and it also holds the major portion of the community's wealth [46].

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dowed man with understanding, with a sense of justice. He must fol-
low these and not think of growing rich by devouring others — by
cheating others, - where Mammon [an obvious thrust at his fellow
Gujaratis] is God, no one worships the true God. Wealth cannot be
reconciled with God. Wealth cannot be

Gandhi has been described as 'the chief representative of the Trans-
vaal merchants' and as 'their strategist and tactician'[53]. This was ini-
tiially but even then only superficially; for the Transvaal traders were
out to protect their businesses while Gandhi was out to protect a prin-
ciple. For a time, between 1906 and 1908, their respective interests
coincided but once these began to diverge the gulf between them he-
came unbreachable.

Gandhi's struggle was obviously not inspired by merchant or trader
interests. Could it then have been inspired by the interests of the la-
bouring class and by the educated class of colonial-born could it have
been, in brief, inspired by the interests of the indentured and ex-indent-
tured Indians?

Gandhi, as has been seen, was impatient with the educated, mainly co-
nomic-born Indians — the spokesmen of the labouring class Indians, who protested about the Indian Congress being too preoccupied,

When a wrong, no matter how flagrant, has continued for a long
period of time, people get habituated to it, and it becomes difficult to
convince the world that it is wrong at all[61].

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However, in 1905 he stated that there was "no remedy" and that the only solution was reconciliation with the fact of the law[62]. Later, upon his return from the first deputation to England (in 1913), he made a stop at Verulam, an ex-indenture stronghold. The welcome committee wanted to know if there was any prospect of the tax being repealed. Gandhi replied that they had put up a stiff fight when the tax was imposed but that at present it was very difficult to obtain any redress in the matter[63]. Familiarity, habit and fait accompli were not the real reasons why the tax was not a plank in the platform of the passive resistance campaign before 1913. Gandhi, with his lawyer's mind and with his conviction that law was religion and religion was law, had persuaded himself that the distinction between an indentured and an immigrant Indian was clear and sharp: free Indian immigration was a matter of Imperial policy; indentured labour was a matter of 'contract and bar-gain'[64].

The tax had no place in the struggle before 1913 because the problems of the indentured labourers, the ex-indentured labourers and the tax were, as far as Gandhi's mind was concerned, peripheral to India's relations with Britain. To Gandhi's way of thinking, the tax was not an Empire issue. It only became one when it was not repealed - non-repeal was a breach of faith with Gokhle and, therefore, an insult to India. He appealed to the Indian miners of Newcastle to come out on strike not because they had been abused and exploited (he had admitted that he had no quarrel with the mine-owners) but because India's honour had been put at stake. He told a group of strikers, during one stage of the march, that they had come out "not as indentured labourers but as servants of India"[65]. Pay and conditions were not Gandhi's concern; the inspiration behind his struggle, whatever it might have been, was not a pro-labour one.

A proposed law (the Draft Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance) in August 1906 set out to control the residence of Indian men, women and children by enforced registration on the assumption that every Transvaal Indian was guilty of having entered the Province illegally. To Gandhi's mind, such procedure and practice were totally alien to British justice, for instead of working on the assumption of guilt, it acted on the opposite principle; the innocent many were made to suffer for the guilty few[66]. Besides, the Act was tantamount to a tax law; it carried a proviso for fingerprinting.

The registration issue came to be embodied in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1907. Opposition to this law was the generator of Gandhi's Passive Resistance or, as he preferred to call it, Satyagraha (literally, soul force) movement. From 1906 to 1914 Gandhi contested a number of different laws, but whether the law coerced the Indians into fingerprint registrations, prevented them from entering the Transvaal or denied them trading rights, he doggedly and consistently opposed these laws because they violated the principle of equality between white and brown British.

In the aftermath of the Indian Sepoy Revolt of 1857 (the "Indian Mutiny" of British history), Queen Victoria made a policy statement that came to constitute the Proclamation of 1858; when, in part, she declared:

"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and these obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfill. And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge. In their prosperity will be our strength; in their contentment our security; and in their gratitude, our best reward."[61]

Gandhi's trust in this declaration, which he called "the Magna Charta of the Indians", and his faith in the British Empire ("I had never had anybody to cherish such loyalty as I did to the British Constitution") remained fast and firm until 1919; that is, a full four years after he had left South Africa[68]. In a 1908 speech he declared, "The British Constitution taught us, it taught me when yet a child that every British subject was to be treated on a footing of equality in the eye of the law[69]."

His years of study in England (1887-1891) reinforced his childhood convictions. England was to him the centre of civilised law, the land of poets, philosophers, intellectuals and statesmen - the land whose Empire was benevolent, altruistic, impartial and colour-blind. These con-
deserves consideration that a community such as the Asiatic com-

to every Briton in South Africa not to lightly dismiss the

small number of educated Indians. It is agreed

I, therefore,

Indian would have been an impossibility in Natal

many words. It generally appears in the demand for admission of a

a craze and fad, I have to fall back upon that idea. Without it .. .the

Although the 'British subject' idea has been rejected by the Press as

They insist on equality in the terms

restriction on immi-

to

futile attempt to get the Indians accepted in South Africa. It stressed

Lord Ampthill thought it 'quixotic'

Gandhi a patient ear, thought that providing for the entry of

Gokhale thought it was 'largely theoretical'.

H. Kitchin and A. West (English-born for the most part) reassured him

vice and esteemed their full trust. India belong to England and England doer

Now, for the first time, the connection between India and Britain

British justice, British beneficence and British altruism were axiomatic

To appreciate why this was so, one must understand that to his mind,

British Indian was a matter more of might of right unbal-

He pleaded:

1897),

rhe Transvaal became part of the Union of South Africa, he would do

Gandhi was fully aware of this argument. In his first-ever publica-

his racial traditions and instincts'

Patrick Duncan, the first Governor-General of South Africa, was,

He abandoned reference to the Proclamation, realising that not

Gandhi a patient ear, thought that providing for the entry of

He wanted Act 2 of 1907 to be repealed and the Im-

it as if to be treated the same as the other British subjects.[72] Thus

he pleaded: let the amendment

Her then advisers, in whom the voters, by their votes, had

the Proclamation of 1858[73]. Later, he issued a souvenir brochure that had a pic-

in Durban he organised a wreath-laying ceremony to mark the

death of Queen Victoria (February 1901), he mentioned the Procla-

tion was ignorant, he would inform them what 'true imperialism' meant;

brought his convictions and sent him reeling morally.

realisation that the presence

befriending of whites: J.D. Doke, H.S.L. Polak, A. Cartwright,

The befriending of whites: J.D. Doke, H.S.L. Polak, A. Cartwright,

in the train and forced to spend a night shivering in the waiting room of a Co-

they are aliens by what is stronger than law,

Asians, a hostility to their entry into the country and a repugnance

it as if to be treated the same as the other British subjects[72]. Thus

an all-important section of the Proclamation[74].

An editorial of The Natal Mercury (18 January 1897), withheld stand-

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he once admitted, was the

very Briton in South Africa not to lightly dismiss the
Gandhi was aware of Duncan's views and he acknowledged, while specificaly referring to the article that contained the passage just cited, that Duncan had "truly analysed the struggle"[84]. Gandhi, of course, had no intention of "flooding" the white-dominated parts of the British Empire with British Asians, what he wanted to safeguard was not the principle of Indian immigration as such, but the principle of Empire equality. This to him was neither quixotic nor foolish but quintessentially; for he made an important, subtle, distinction between the theory and practice: theory should be sound, though one may fail to carry it out in practice," Safeguarding theory was obeying the law of higher nature; departing from it in practice was giving in to the temptation of base human nature[85]. However negative a practice may be, it should never, he protested, be confirmed in law.

To Gandhi, allowing in theory an educated brown Briton to enter South Africa like a white Briton put India's relations with Britain on a par, ensured reciprocally and engendered mutual respect[86]. It is with this ideal in mind that he wrote: "We are not fighting on behalf of the educated or the highly educated but for India's association with Britain; a denial that undermined the very foundation of the Empire and the status of India's part in that Empire stood fast; and this foundation was not divorced from India; so that in 1909, Preservation 'India's honour' meant, in one sense, that his credo, setting forth how and why Indian independence must be his heart and mind, autonomous.

As he wrote: 'We are not fighting on behalf of the immigration law which imposes on the Immigration of Asians restrictions which are not imposed on Europeans'[85].

of attacking Hinduism because they tried to interfere with the custom of child marriages; in 1897 Congress, for the first time, criticized representation through nomination; in 1895 Tilak revived the fanatic of Shivaji, the hero and liberator of Maharashtra from the Moslems; in 1897 a British health officer was assaulted; in 1899 partition of Bengal sparked off country-wide revolts; set in italic the nationwide singing of Bande Mataram (Half Mother) - the Indian Nationalism and transformed a sedate, elitist nationalist movement into a fiery, popular and country-wide unrest; in 1905 the Swadesi (boycott) movement was launched; in 1907 the Sedition Act was passed, and there was an open split between the "left" and "liberal" wings of the nationalist movement; in 1908 Tilak (the most important nationalist leader since 1896) was arrested and sent to prison for six years, workers in a Bombay textile mill went on strike in protest and a bomb was thrown at a British District judge; in 1909 Curzon Wyllie, a member of India House, was assassinated in London; in 1910 the Indian Press Act, which gagged the nationalist newspapers, was passed; in 1911 the Morley-Minto Reforms overturned the Bengal partition[89].

Gandhi's thoughts and writings, while he was involved in South Africa, were never divorced from India; so that in 1909, while he was still immersed in the politics of the Transvaal and still weighed down by the soothing passive resistance campaign, he wrote (on his return voyage from England) a pamphlet titled (Hail Mother), an extreme, principled and transformed a sedate, elitist nationalist movement to illustrate his perception of that partnership. This explains the doctrine held down by the Transvaal Government, and asserted to by the Imperial Government cut at the foundation of the Empire. If the doctrine be true, the people of India cease to be partners in the Empire, and it is in order to resist this dangerous, immo-
ral and pestilent doctrine that we in the Transvaal are fighting.

Here was the true inspiration and the real spur of the struggle as Gandhi

saw it in November 1909. And true and real it remained until the very

end. The report of his farewell speech in July 1914 (the month he left

South Africa for the fifth and last time) noted:

Behind that struggle for concrete rights lay the peat spirit which

asked for an abstract principle, and the fight which was undertaken

in 1906, although it was a fight against a particuiar

law,

was a fight

undertaken in order to combat the spirit that ... was about ... to

undermine the glorious British Constitution.

The choice, it went on to point out, was between ‘two courses': either

he and his compatriots break with the British Empire or they fight to

preserve the ideal of the Constitution[93].

Gandhi’s attachment to India was pious, his adherence to its na-

tionalism was mystical and his commitment to its image as ‘motherland'

was devout. ‘I think of my love for the Motherland’, he admitted, ‘as an

aspect of my religion’[94]. To him, serving India was equivalent to serv-

ing God. And since, as he often said, ‘truth is God, or God is nothing

but truth’[95], fighting the good fight for India was equivalent to fight-

ing the good fight for ‘truth’. The fight that Gandhi led in South Af’ri-

ca was not a race or class strugle (nor even an individual or personal

struggle) but a national struggle — a struggle on behalf of truth, God

and India.
1. Gandhi in South Africa: British imperialism and the Indian question, (History and Law, 1913), 177.
2. Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. II (New Delhi, 1938-1946). Quotations referring to the M. Gandhi, "Statement of the Transvaal Indian case", 16 July 1906, CW, IX, 266. He also said, "Our country was not advanced at all, it was a whole."
3. "We certainly expected that the country was going to prefer English society, it should keep to as far as we can in consequence of the English as a rule."
4. From Freedom and Opinion, 31 August 1908, CW, IV, 97.
5. My experience in goal [I], Indian Opinion, 7 March 1908, CW, III, 155.
7. "We certainly appreciate the country that the English society is so far as we can in consequence of the English as a rule."
59. Satyagraha in South Africa, 246. It is suggested that Gandhi suddenly in 1911, he was a
before the coming of the war. It would have been possible to venture - because it was confounded
South African Indian] problems (Munawar, Gandhi, 219), but the evidence for this
63. "Reply to a misleading address at Penzance", 28 January 1908, Indian Opinion, 5 January
64. "An acotic policy", Indian Opinion, 19 May 1909, CW, II, 318. This was in reply to a
65. "Indian nationalism", Indian Opinion, 26 June 1907, CW, VII, 423. For the case of the
66. "The proclamation of the translation", CW, IX, 358. In the absence of findings the
67. "The proclamation of the translation", CW, IX, 358. In the absence of findings the
68. "The proclamation of the translation", CW, IX, 358. In the absence of findings the
69. "The proclamation of the translation", CW, IX, 358. In the absence of findings the
70. "The proclamation of the translation", CW, IX, 358. In the absence of findings the
71. "The proclamation of the translation", CW, IX, 358. In the absence of findings the
72. "True imperialism", Indian Opinion, 3 July 1903, CW, X, 215. In reporting the
74. The speech was in the South African Indian, 12 November 1909, CW, 3:13.
But Gokhale had also pronounced similarly in 1894 when he said, in relation to a piece of discriminatory legislation passed by the British in India: 'The pledge of equal treatment which England had given to us, as a high and worthy ideal for our nation, and if these pledges are repudiated, one of the strongest claims of British rule to our attachment will disappear.' Quoted by Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, I, 115.

93. Speech at farewell banquet, 14 July 1914, CW, XII, 476.